Deciding on appropriate use of force: human-machine interaction in weapons systems and emerging norms

This article considers the role of norms in the debate on autonomous weapons systems (AWS). It argues that the academic and political discussion is largely dominated by considerations of how AWS relate to norms institutionalised in international law. While this debate on AWS has produced insights on legal and ethical norms and sounded options of a possible regulation or ban, it neglects to investigate how complex human-machine interactions in weapons systems can set standards of appropriate use of force, which are politically-normatively relevant but take place outside of formal, deliberative law-setting. While such procedural norms are already emerging in the practice of contemporary warfare, the increasing technological complexity of AI-driven weapons will add to their political-normative relevance. I argue that public deliberation about and political oversight and accountability of the use of force is at risk of being consumed and normalised by functional procedures and perceptions. This can have a profound impact on future of remote-warfare and security policy

The Water-Energy-Food Nexus: A systematic review of methods for nexus assessment

The water-energy-food (WEF) nexus is rapidly expanding in scholarly literature and policy settings as a novel way to address complex resource and development challenges. The nexus approach aims to identify tradeoffs and synergies of water, energy, and food systems, internalize social and environmental impacts, and guide development of cross-sectoral policies. However, while the WEF nexus offers a promising conceptual approach, the use of WEF nexus methods to systematically evaluate water, energy, and food interlinkages or support development of socially and politically-relevant resource policies has been limited. This paper reviews WEF nexus methods to provide a knowledge base of existing approaches and promote further development of analytical methods that align with nexus thinking. The systematic review of 245 journal articles and book chapters reveals that (a) use of specific and reproducible methods for nexus assessment is uncommon (less than one-third); (b) nexus methods frequently fall short of capturing interactions among water, energy, and food—the very linkages they conceptually purport to address; (c) assessments strongly favor quantitative approaches (nearly three-quarters); (d) use of social science methods is limited (approximately one-quarter); and (e) many nexus methods are confined to disciplinary silos—only about one-quarter combine methods from diverse disciplines and less than one-fifth utilize both quantitative and qualitative approaches. To help overcome these limitations, we derive four key features of nexus analytical tools and methods—innovation, context, collaboration, and implementation—from the literature that reflect WEF nexus thinking. By evaluating existing nexus analytical approaches based on these features, we highlight 18 studies that demonstrate promising advances to guide future research. This paper finds that to address complex resource and development challenges, mixed-methods and transdisciplinary approaches are needed that incorporate social and political dimensions of water, energy, and food; utilize multiple and interdisciplinary approaches; and engage stakeholders and decision-makers.Open Access Article. UA Open Access Publishing Fund.This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Moving Beyond Semantics on Autonomous Weapons: Meaningful Human Control in Operation

Ongoing discussions about autonomous weapons typically share concerns of losing control and the potentially destabilizing consequences for global security. To the extent that there is any consensus among states, academics, NGOs and other commentators involved in diplomatic efforts under the auspices of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, it is grounded in the idea that all weapons should be subject to meaningful human control. This intuitively appealing concept immediately gained traction, although at a familiar legal-political cost: nobody knows what the concept actually means in practice. Although global discourses on policy and governance are typically infused with ambiguity, abstract concepts are of little use if they ignore the operational context that confronts the military in their application. This article places this intuitively appealing concept in context, and thus examines it in operational practice. Paying attention to this military practice is important as it demonstrates that meaningful human control is not the only, or the best, approach through which to characterize the human role and govern the challenges raised by autonomous weapons

Who is to blame for Autonomous Weapons Systems’ misdoings?

This Chapter analyses who (or what) should be held responsible for behaviours by autonomous weapons systems (AWS) that, were they enacted by a human agent, would qualify as internationally wrongful acts. After illustrating the structural problems which make ascription of responsibility for AWS’ activities particularly difficult, when not impossible, the alternative routes proposed to solve the ensuing responsibility gap will be assessed. The analysis will focus, in the first place, on the international criminal responsibility of the individuals who, in one way or another, are involved in the process of production, deployment and activation of the AWS. The possibility to hold the deploying State accountable for AWS’ wrongdoings will then be gauged. Subsequently, attention will be paid to the responsibility of the corporations manufacturing and/or programming the AWS. It will be observed that these options may solve some responsibility problems more effectively than critics of AWS are ready to admit. At the same time, it will be shown that, unless a no-fault liability regime is adopted, autonomy in weapons systems is bound to magnify the risk that no one may be held to answer for acts which are objectively in contrast with international legal prescriptions. Also, it will be argued that, given the complementary relationship among the various forms of responsibility under international law, proposals aimed at focusing solely on one of these at the expense of others are incapable of leading to satisfying results